The departure of U.S. troops from Iraq in September 2026, following the drawdown in Syria earlier in the year, may be a welcome development in certain circles in Washington, Baghdad, and Damascus. For various minoritized or minority communities in these troubled countries, however, it heralds a new era of uncertainty and serious security risks.
For years, the U.S. military presence and its support for local partners, including the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Kurdish Peshmerga, and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), provided an important bulwark against threats to minority communities. Although the circumstances differ between Iraq and Syria, the withdrawal raises questions about the future security of these vulnerable populations.
Iraq
In Iraq, the Islamic State (ISIS) and Iran-backed Shia armed factions pose different threats to minority communities, particularly in the country’s north.
As demonstrated by its violence between 2014 and 2019, and earlier as al-Qaeda in Iraq, ISIS remains a threat to Yezidis, Christians, Kaka’is, Shabaks, Shias, and Kurds. Although its activities have declined considerably in recent years, renewed attacks in late September and October raise concerns that the group senses opportunities emerging from the U.S. withdrawal. ISIS has staged successful comebacks before, most notably between 2012 and 2014 in Iraq. Its operational experience, familiarity with local terrain, and ability to exploit security gaps should not be underestimated, particularly amid regional conflict and growing instability.
Ensuring that minority communities in Nineveh, Kirkuk, and Diyala provinces have a meaningful role in local security arrangements is therefore essential. In Yezidi-majority Sinjar, armed Yezidi groups, particularly the Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS), have reportedly been moving toward integration into Iraqi security structures. Such arrangements could be constructive, provided Yezidis preserve a meaningful role in protecting the area.
The importance of this participation is rooted in the traumatic experience of the summer of 2014. Iraqi army units and subsequently Kurdish Peshmerga forces failed to defend Sinjar against ISIS, leaving the Yezidis exposed to the jihadi group’s genocidal campaign. A peer-reviewed study has estimated that approximately 9,900 Yezidis were killed or kidnapped during the group’s initial assault. Genuine Yezidi participation in locally deployed security forces would strengthen local protection and help build trust in security institutions.
Similar concerns apply to Christians in the Nineveh Plains and to Kaka’i and Shabak communities, whose religious identities have historically made them targets of jihadist violence. The post-2003 experience, particularly the ISIS onslaught in 2014, demonstrated their vulnerability. Large numbers fled to safer areas, including the Kurdistan Region, while many eventually emigrated, particularly to Europe. In Nineveh, Iran-backed factions within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) are fueling tensions among minority communities, particularly Shabaks and Christians. Additionally, smaller Shia communities in Tal Afar and areas around Tuz Khurmatu and Amerli also remain potential targets of renewed jihadist violence.
As for the Kurdistan Region, while it is better equipped to confront ISIS than smaller communities in Sinjar and the Nineveh Plains, its principal vulnerability today stems from a different threat: Iran and Iran-backed armed factions operating in Iraq. Since the outbreak of hostilities in late February involving Iran, the United States, and Israel, the autonomous region has endured sustained missile and drone attacks. By August, the Kurdistan Region had already come under more than 1,000 such attacks, a figure that has since continued to rise as Iran and its allied militias in Iraq press on with their strikes. Separately, Community Peacemaker Teams documented 22 fatalities and 112 injuries resulting from such attacks between February 28 and May 28.
With U.S. troops and their associated air-defense capabilities withdrawn from Kurdistan, Iran and its allied Iraqi armed factions may feel further emboldened to continue these strikes. Combined with the persistent ISIS threat, such attacks could seriously destabilize the Kurdistan Region, undermining its longstanding role as a relative safe haven for Iraq’s vulnerable communities. A sustained deterioration could also generate large waves of outward migration, initially toward Turkey and potentially onward to Europe.
These risks demand greater attention from Washington and Iraq’s political leadership. Counterterrorism cooperation, credible protection against missile and drone attacks, and meaningful minority participation in local security institutions should remain priorities even after the U.S. military withdrawal.
Syria
In Syria, the U.S. military withdrawal and the dissolution of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have raised serious concerns about the security and political future of minority communities, particularly the Kurds. These developments follow a year of sectarian violence that exposed the vulnerability of Alawites, Druze, Christians, and other minorities under the new authorities in Damascus.
The U.S.-led coalition completed its withdrawal in April 2026, following heavy fighting between the SDF and Damascus that cost the Kurdish-led force most of its Arab-majority territories. The fighting erupted after the December 2025 deadline for implementing an earlier integration agreement expired. A new agreement reached on January 29 paved the way for the SDF’s integration into state institutions. Subsequently, an SDF-affiliated figure was appointed governor of Hasakah, another became mayor of Kobani, and Kurdish representatives gained limited parliamentary representation.
On August 25, SDF commander-in-chief Mazloum Abdi announced the force’s dissolution and was appointed a presidential adviser. Established in 2015 with U.S. support, the multiethnic SDF played a central role in defeating ISIS’s territorial caliphate in 2019. Washington has since shifted its partnership toward President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government, which joined the anti-ISIS coalition in November 2025. U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack declared in January that the SDF’s role as Washington’s principal counter-ISIS partner had effectively expired following Assad’s downfall.
For Syria’s minorities, however, growing U.S. dependence on Damascus presents considerable risks. In March 2025, more than 1,400 people, predominantly Alawite civilians, were killed in sectarian violence along Syria’s western coast following attacks by insurgents linked to the former Assad regime. In July, fighting between Druze armed groups and forces aligned with Damascus left more than 1,700 members of the Druze community dead and approximately 200,000 displaced. The violence included executions of Druze civilians. The predominantly Druze-populated Suwayda province still remains largely outside the control of Damascus, partly due to Israeli support for Druze armed groups.
Although Damascus has pledged to investigate abuses and Syrian courts issued their first verdicts concerning the coastal massacres in September 2026, these measures have yet to restore confidence among vulnerable communities. Preventing further violence and ensuring accountability, including for abuses committed by government-affiliated forces, remain essential.
Christians, who are estimated to constitute up to 10 percent of the Syrian population, face both security threats and concerns about religious freedoms. A suicide bombing at a Damascus church in June 2025 reportedly killed 25 people and injured 63 others. Government restrictions on alcohol sales and consumption, introduced in March 2026, also raised concerns about the imposition of conservative Islamic norms. The authorities allowed only stores in three Christian neighborhoods to sell alcohol. Public protests prompted authorities to suspend the restrictions. In a positive move, Damascus has taken steps to restore Jewish properties and religious sites and facilitated a visit by former Syrian Chief Rabbi Yusuf Hamra in 2025. Such initiatives could help rebuild minority confidence if accompanied by broader protections for religious diversity.
As for Syria’s Kurds, the dissolution of the SDF and the end of its partnership with Washington have significantly weakened their political and security position. Although Sharaa’s January Decree 13 in January 2026 recognized certain Kurdish civil, cultural, and national rights, the loss of self-administration has generated considerable anxiety. Restrictions limiting Kurdish-language instruction to three classes per week have further fueled dissatisfaction.
Tensions have also intensified between Kurdish and Arab communities in Hasakah, where some Arab tribal groups demand greater direct control by Damascus than agreed upon by the integration deal in January. On October 8, Arab protesters removed symbols of the former Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration during a Syrian flag-raising ceremony. The following day, anti-SDF demonstrators displayed images of Saddam Hussein, evoking painful memories of Baathist persecution and the 2004 Qamishli uprising. The September killing of former SDF fighter Sipan by an armed tribal group also triggered Kurdish protests, including in Kobani, where seven inmates died in a prison fire.
These incidents underscore the persistent mistrust between the Kurdish community and Damascus and the potential for localized confrontations to escalate into broader communal violence. Without credible guarantees for Kurdish cultural rights, meaningful participation in local governance and security, and effective protection against communal attacks, the integration process risks deepening instability.
Washington’s military departure should therefore not mark the end of its engagement with Syria’s minorities. Continued diplomatic pressure on Damascus to protect vulnerable communities, ensure accountability for abuses, and accommodate Kurdish political and cultural rights will remain essential to preventing renewed violence and preserving Syria’s fragile stability.
Concluding remarks
As the Middle East undergoes another period of profound restructuring, its future should not reproduce the failures of the political order established a century ago. Lasting stability requires states to recognize and respect the distinct identities, historical experiences, and rights of indigenous minoritized or minority communities and build trust between the central state and minorities. Their ability to exercise genuine local self-governance and practice their own religious and ethnic/cultural customs in their traditional homelands must be part of any durable regional settlement.
- Mohammed A. Salih is a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and a Middle East Minorities Institute Council of Experts member.
- Wladimir van Wilgenburg is an on-the-ground based reporter and analyst specialized in Kurdish affairs, and a Middle East Minorities Institute Advisory Board member.
The views, thoughts, and opinions expressed in this article belong solely to the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy, position, or views of the Middle East Minorities Institute, its leadership, or its affiliates.