The fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 offered a chance to build a state where citizenship, rather than sect or ethnicity, determined protection. Nearly two years later, that promise is receding. Alawites, Druze, Kurds, and Christians face recurring, though not identical, patterns of identity-based violence, institutional exclusion, and ineffective accountability.
The clearest warning came in March 2025. The UN Commission of Inquiry reported that some 1,400 people, predominantly civilians, were killed in violence across coastal and western-central Syria, particularly in Alawite-majority communities. It found that former government fighters and interim-government forces likely committed war crimes, including murder, torture, abduction, pillage, and property destruction. Human rights organizations documented further abuses; UN experts also raised allegations of enforced disappearances, kidnapping, and gender-based violence against Alawites, with women and children particularly targeted.
Months later, the UN Commission documented another wave of identity-based violence in Suwayda. Government and affiliated forces were implicated in summary executions, arbitrary detention, torture, abduction, looting, and forced displacement against Druze civilians. Forces that entered claiming to restore order became part of the threat. That recurrence exposed a structural failure of control, protection, and accountability.
Violations continued. Syrians for Truth and Justice documented sectarian arrests, assaults, sexual harassment, abduction, extortion, enforced disappearance, and threats against Alawites in Tartus and elsewhere, alongside police and judicial failures to provide remedies. Kurdish communities faced arbitrary detention, forced displacement, property seizure, and attacks on cultural symbols; Christians faced armed intimidation and lethal violence. Across these contexts, collective blame, identity checks, sectarian or ethnic rhetoric, inadequately vetted armed formations, and lack of accountability reveal a broader failure of protection.
Formal guarantees provide little security. This weakness was built into the transition: The National Dialogue Conference was announced only two days before it convened, influential political and ethnic forces were excluded, participation was selective, and the seven-member constitutional drafting committee did not reflect Syria’s political, ethnic, religious, or gender diversity. The Constitutional Declaration recognizes equality and cultural diversity but lacks enforceable protections for national, religious, linguistic, and cultural pluralism, concentrates executive authority, and inadequately safeguards judicial independence. The transitional-justice framework reproduces this exclusion: Its initial mandate covers only former-regime violations, leaving victims of ISIS and other state and non-state actors, especially many from minority communities, outside its scope. Rights without enforcement, or accountability through institutions implicated in alleged abuses, remain largely protections on paper.
ISIS’s 2014 genocide against the Yazidis shows the danger of waiting until mass atrocities are underway. Dehumanizing rhetoric, collective punishment, weak institutions, armed extremism, impunity, and the withdrawal of protection can combine rapidly. Minority protection is not a “soft” human-rights concern separate from counterterrorism and security. Leaving communities exposed produces displacement, distrust, and security vacuums—the conditions in which ISIS and other extremist actors thrive. Preventing that used to be somebody’s job.
The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS was built for exactly that job. Dexter Ingram served as its Acting Director and helped run ministerials from Rome to Rabat to Riyadh to Washington. What the public saw was a communiqué and a group photo. The room itself was less photogenic: 89 governments, almost none of whose national interests lined up neatly with each other’s, agreeing to keep working the same lines of effort for another year.
The tensions were real. Turkey and the Syrian Democratic Forces couldn’t sit at the same table, so for years the coalition ran parallel conversations, and somebody had to carry messages between them. Gulf members carried their own rivalries into the counter-finance work. European capitals wanted the detention problem handled without taking back their own citizens. Baghdad needed to demonstrate sovereignty while relying on coalition support to hold the line. Any one of those could have derailed the enterprise, and a few nearly did.
American leadership is what kept it from collapsing. Washington had the standing to hold the chair and spent real capital keeping people in their seats. When a member decided its bilateral grievance mattered more than the collective agenda, a call went out, usually from someone senior enough to make the conversation uncomfortable. That work never showed up in a communiqué. It’s what kept 89 competing interests pointed at the same target. Take it away and you don’t get a coalition that argues more. You get one that stops meeting.
That’s roughly where we are now. The military mission in Iraq ended on Sept. 30, 2026. The working groups were restructured in 2025, and the ones that carried the load on foreign terrorist fighters and stabilization haven’t functioned in any serious way since. The Global Coalition still exists on paper. It even added a 90th member in February, when Syria joined at the Riyadh meeting. But membership isn’t machinery.
Al-Hol is the proof. When the SDF pulled its guards in January, the camp held roughly 24,000 people. By late February it had been emptied, with something like 20,000 unaccounted for and no coordinated system for documenting where any of them went. The annex holding more than 6,000 foreign nationals from over 40 countries was vacated. Under the old structure, that would have triggered an emergency session of the foreign terrorist fighter working group, a coordinated demarche to every country of origin, and a fight over biometric records and chain of custody, because those records are the only thing standing between a released detainee and a clean passport. Instead, it produced a press release.
Stabilization went the same way. At its peak the coalition raised close to $600 million in pledges in a single year for areas liberated from ISIS, and that money paid for exactly what’s missing now: local policing that answers to somebody, courts that function, and services in communities that would otherwise accept whatever governance shows up armed. Minority protection and stabilization were never separate files. They were the same line of effort, and it’s the one nobody is funding.
Damascus has said it intends to lead counter-ISIS efforts itself. Maybe it will. But this is the same government the UN Commission implicated in violations committed in coastal regions and Suwayda, and the ask now is that it protect the communities it stands accused of failing while also tracking foreign fighters nobody else is counting. That’s a lot to take on faith. Somebody has to hold the chair. Right now, nobody is, and the bill will come due for minority Syrian communities.
- Bassam Al-Ahmad is the Co-founder & Executive Director of Syrians for Truth and Justice. He is a member of the Middle East Minorities Institute Council of Experts.
- Dexter Ingram served as the Acting Director of the State Department’s Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS office through 2023 and as Director of Countering Violent Extremism through 2025. He is a member of the Middle East Minorities Institute Advisory Board.
The views, thoughts, and opinions expressed in this article belong solely to the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy, position, or views of the Middle East Minorities Institute, its leadership, or its affiliates.
Commentary
Syria’s Minorities Face More Than a Failure of Protection
The fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 offered a chance to build a state where citizenship, rather than sect or ethnicity, determined protection. Nearly two years later, that promise is receding. Alawites, Druze, Kurds, and Christians face recurring, though not identical, patterns of identity-based violence, institutional exclusion, and ineffective accountability.
The clearest warning came in March 2025. The UN Commission of Inquiry reported that some 1,400 people, predominantly civilians, were killed in violence across coastal and western-central Syria, particularly in Alawite-majority communities. It found that former government fighters and interim-government forces likely committed war crimes, including murder, torture, abduction, pillage, and property destruction. Human rights organizations documented further abuses; UN experts also raised allegations of enforced disappearances, kidnapping, and gender-based violence against Alawites, with women and children particularly targeted.
Months later, the UN Commission documented another wave of identity-based violence in Suwayda. Government and affiliated forces were implicated in summary executions, arbitrary detention, torture, abduction, looting, and forced displacement against Druze civilians. Forces that entered claiming to restore order became part of the threat. That recurrence exposed a structural failure of control, protection, and accountability.
Violations continued. Syrians for Truth and Justice documented sectarian arrests, assaults, sexual harassment, abduction, extortion, enforced disappearance, and threats against Alawites in Tartus and elsewhere, alongside police and judicial failures to provide remedies. Kurdish communities faced arbitrary detention, forced displacement, property seizure, and attacks on cultural symbols; Christians faced armed intimidation and lethal violence. Across these contexts, collective blame, identity checks, sectarian or ethnic rhetoric, inadequately vetted armed formations, and lack of accountability reveal a broader failure of protection.
Formal guarantees provide little security. This weakness was built into the transition: The National Dialogue Conference was announced only two days before it convened, influential political and ethnic forces were excluded, participation was selective, and the seven-member constitutional drafting committee did not reflect Syria’s political, ethnic, religious, or gender diversity. The Constitutional Declaration recognizes equality and cultural diversity but lacks enforceable protections for national, religious, linguistic, and cultural pluralism, concentrates executive authority, and inadequately safeguards judicial independence. The transitional-justice framework reproduces this exclusion: Its initial mandate covers only former-regime violations, leaving victims of ISIS and other state and non-state actors, especially many from minority communities, outside its scope. Rights without enforcement, or accountability through institutions implicated in alleged abuses, remain largely protections on paper.
ISIS’s 2014 genocide against the Yazidis shows the danger of waiting until mass atrocities are underway. Dehumanizing rhetoric, collective punishment, weak institutions, armed extremism, impunity, and the withdrawal of protection can combine rapidly. Minority protection is not a “soft” human-rights concern separate from counterterrorism and security. Leaving communities exposed produces displacement, distrust, and security vacuums—the conditions in which ISIS and other extremist actors thrive. Preventing that used to be somebody’s job.
The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS was built for exactly that job. Dexter Ingram served as its Acting Director and helped run ministerials from Rome to Rabat to Riyadh to Washington. What the public saw was a communiqué and a group photo. The room itself was less photogenic: 89 governments, almost none of whose national interests lined up neatly with each other’s, agreeing to keep working the same lines of effort for another year.
The tensions were real. Turkey and the Syrian Democratic Forces couldn’t sit at the same table, so for years the coalition ran parallel conversations, and somebody had to carry messages between them. Gulf members carried their own rivalries into the counter-finance work. European capitals wanted the detention problem handled without taking back their own citizens. Baghdad needed to demonstrate sovereignty while relying on coalition support to hold the line. Any one of those could have derailed the enterprise, and a few nearly did.
American leadership is what kept it from collapsing. Washington had the standing to hold the chair and spent real capital keeping people in their seats. When a member decided its bilateral grievance mattered more than the collective agenda, a call went out, usually from someone senior enough to make the conversation uncomfortable. That work never showed up in a communiqué. It’s what kept 89 competing interests pointed at the same target. Take it away and you don’t get a coalition that argues more. You get one that stops meeting.
That’s roughly where we are now. The military mission in Iraq ended on Sept. 30, 2026. The working groups were restructured in 2025, and the ones that carried the load on foreign terrorist fighters and stabilization haven’t functioned in any serious way since. The Global Coalition still exists on paper. It even added a 90th member in February, when Syria joined at the Riyadh meeting. But membership isn’t machinery.
Al-Hol is the proof. When the SDF pulled its guards in January, the camp held roughly 24,000 people. By late February it had been emptied, with something like 20,000 unaccounted for and no coordinated system for documenting where any of them went. The annex holding more than 6,000 foreign nationals from over 40 countries was vacated. Under the old structure, that would have triggered an emergency session of the foreign terrorist fighter working group, a coordinated demarche to every country of origin, and a fight over biometric records and chain of custody, because those records are the only thing standing between a released detainee and a clean passport. Instead, it produced a press release.
Stabilization went the same way. At its peak the coalition raised close to $600 million in pledges in a single year for areas liberated from ISIS, and that money paid for exactly what’s missing now: local policing that answers to somebody, courts that function, and services in communities that would otherwise accept whatever governance shows up armed. Minority protection and stabilization were never separate files. They were the same line of effort, and it’s the one nobody is funding.
Damascus has said it intends to lead counter-ISIS efforts itself. Maybe it will. But this is the same government the UN Commission implicated in violations committed in coastal regions and Suwayda, and the ask now is that it protect the communities it stands accused of failing while also tracking foreign fighters nobody else is counting. That’s a lot to take on faith. Somebody has to hold the chair. Right now, nobody is, and the bill will come due for minority Syrian communities.
The views, thoughts, and opinions expressed in this article belong solely to the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy, position, or views of the Middle East Minorities Institute, its leadership, or its affiliates.
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